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AMBIGUITY SURROUNDING INDIVIDUAL SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LIABILITY ON THE FEDERAL AND
STATE LEVEL IN MASSACHUSETTS
I. INTRODUCTION

Whether a court will hold a defendant individually liable for sexual
harassment is a highly contested area in employment litigation.' On the
federal level, the circuit courts differ as to whether and to what extent, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") allows for recovery
from an individual. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (hereinafter "First Circuit") has not definitively3 decided the issue,
while federal district courts in the circuit remain split.
On the state level, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B
(hereinafter "Chapter 1511B") prohibits sexual harassment or discrimination by an employer, by himself, or through his agent. 4 In addition to the
1Robert Lukens, Comment, Workplace Sexual Harassment and IndividualLiability,
69 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 303 (1996). See also Davida H. Isaacs, "Its Nothing Personal"But Should It Be?: Finding Agent Liability for Violations of the Federal Employment
Discrimination Statutes, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. Change 505, 508 (1996) (noting the
issue's prevalence as evidenced by the number of recent articles on the topic).
2 See, e.g., Dici v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996)
(finding an agent cannot be sued for damages in his individual capacity under Title VII);
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1312 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals are not
liable under the Title VII definition of employer); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100,
104 (4th Cir. 1994) (imposing Title VII individual liability due to individual's exercising
significant control over the plaintiffs employment conditions). Much of the controversy
surrounding whether individuals may be held liable under Title VII regards the statutory
definition of "employer." Robert Cavallaro, Note, CorporateBuyer Beware: Deficiencies
in Directors' and Officers' Insurance For Employment PracticesLiability, 26 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 217, 231 (1997). Title VII defines "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a
person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
3 See, e.g., Contreras-Bordallo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya De Puerto Rico, 952 F.
Supp. 72, 73 (D.P.R. 1997) (holding that supervisory employees may not be held liable
under Title VII); Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 571-72 (D.R.I. 1996) (finding
that supervisory employees may be individually liable under Title VII); Ruffino v. State St.
Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047-48 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that individuals
may be subject to personal liability);
4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(l)(1996). The statute provides in pertinent part
that it is an unlawful employment practice:
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statute's general employer liability, Chapter 151 B also provides individual
liability for aiding or abetting sexual harassment. 5 The statute provides no
guidance as to what conduct rises to the level of aiding and abetting harassment, nor has the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (hereinafter
"SJC") addressed the issue. This lack of meaning afforded to the aiding
and abetting statute left the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts to interpret
the state law through its supplemental jurisdic6
tion in two recent cases.

The current case law in Massachusetts regarding individual liability
under both Title VII and Chapter 151B § 4(5) create unpredictability and
unreliability for practitioners bringing and defending such claims. Part
One of this article discusses the importance of the individual liability
question and its practical implications. Part Two calls for the First Circuit
to reach a decision regarding Title VII individual liability. This section
examines the current Title VII case law in other circuits and opines that the
First Circuit should fall in line with the majority of courts negating individual liability. Part Three explains the need for the SJC or the Massachusetts legislature to define the parameters of individual liability for aiding
and abetting sexual harassment. This section addresses the recent Chapter
151 B § 4(5) case law handed down by the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts and outlines the court's seemingly faulty reasoning. Finally, Part Four concludes by suggesting that the ambiguity surrounding individual liability and the issue's importance to attorneys in the
field, requires the First Circuit and the SJC to clarify the federal and state
anti-discrimination statutes.
For an employer, by himself or through his agent, because of... sex ... to
refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such
individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation, or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, unless based on a bona fide
occupational qualification. Id.
5 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(5) (1996).

This section provides that "it is
unlawful for any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite,
compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to
do so." id.
6 See Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 79 (D. Mass. 1997) (deciding
that mere inaction or failure to investigate, may rise to the level of aiding and abetting under
the statute); Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co., 989 F. Supp. 54, 61-62 (D. Mass. 1997)
(finding that two factors must be present for inaction to give rise to liability). The
Morehouse court implied from the Chapin decision that for liability to attach, an individual
defendant must be "required to act under the circumstances" and must be "in a position to
discipline the harassers and stop the conduct." Morehouse, 989 F. Supp. at 62.
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II. PRACTICAL EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Several practical nuances surround the theory of individual liability
for sexual harassment which reveal the importance to practitioners, for the
SJC and the First Circuit to more clearly define the parameters of liability
on the state and federal level.
A. PotentialConflict of Interest Between Employer and Individual
Whenever multiple parties are represented by one attorney or firm, the
possibility of conflict arising exists. 7 Although an employer usually prefers a united defense in such a case, conflicts are known to arise when the
employer discovers that its employee was acting outside the scope of his
employment. 8 At this point, the employer will typically wish to assert that
it is not liable for the employee's acts, thereby creating a conflict.9 Often
these circumstances require that an attorney or firm withdraw due to discordant interests, making adequate representation of either party impossible. l° In this sense, clarity in the law regarding individual liability is required in order for attorneys defending discrimination claims to plan and
strategize accordingly to avoid such conflicts.
B. Strategic Implications ofAllowing Individual Liability
Plaintiffs often are well advised to name individual defendants in a
sex discrimination suit to insure against a judgement-proof employer."
Small companies are sometimes likely to go bankrupt or defunct either
voluntarily or involuntarily in order to make themselves judgement proof

7 Alan M. Koral & Walter Lucas, Defending The Individual Management Party

Under State Law, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1997, at 235, 271
(PLI Lit. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5256 1997).
8 Id.

9 Id. Koral et al. note that O'Reilly v. Executone of Albany, Inc, 522 N.Y.S.2d 724
(3d Dep't 1987) is representative of conflicts that arise in the representation of both
employer and individual defendant in a sex discrimination case. Id. The law firm perceived
a conflict because it learned that the employer intended to aver that even if its employee did
discriminate, the employer possessed no prior knowledge of, nor did it acquiesce in the
conduct. Id. at 275. The firm advised the individual to obtain separate counsel, but
eventually was forced to seek a court order permitting withdrawal. Id. The court allowed
this withdrawal, stating that the firm would not have afforded either client adequate
representation because of the "discordant interests at trial." Id. (citing O'Reilly 522 N.Y.S.
at 724).
1o See Id. (discussing practical conflict of interest problems) (citing O'Reilly, at 724).
" id. at 280.
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against a successful employment discrimination case. 12 In these cases,
naming an individual defendant
may be the easiest, or the only possible
13
source of monetary damages.
In addition, if individual liability is allowed, plaintiffs may use the
naming of individuals in a complaint as a means of destroying federal diversity jurisdiction. 14 The addition of non-diverse defendants will prevent
an employer defendant from removing the case to federal court.' 5 In this
practical sense, allowing individual liability may provide a useful tactic, as
6
plaintiffs often favor state courts to federal courts in discrimination suits.'
Individual liability also may provide plaintiffs another litigation advantage in the form of a "fear factor."'17 Individual defendants may be
fearful about the cost of litigation and attorney's fees, the prospect of paying any damage award imposed on them, as well as an adverse judgement's
effect on their career paths.18 This fear potentially
may cause a defendant
19
to influence an early settlement with all parties.
Finally, the potential for individual liability in the employment context triggers a need for employers and individuals to invest in insurance
policies covering acts of employment. 20 Some individual suits are covered
under defendants' homeowners' insurance policies. 2' Corporate Directors
and Officers policies often cover employers and provide defense and indemnification for an employer in the case of an individual's negligent
acts. 22 To provide coverage against the more often alleged, intentional
12

Alan M. Koral & Walter Lucas, Defending The Individual Management Party

Under State Law, in LmGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1997, at 235, 280
(PLI Lit. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5256 1997).
13 Id.
14See Id. (discussing forum shopping in the context of individual liability).
'5

Id.

16 Id.

Plaintiffs prefer state court because of the less stringent summary judgement
practice, allowing more cases to proceed to trial. Id. In addition, state law is often more
favorable to plaintiffs, elected judges may be more sympathetic to plaintiffs, and federal
judges are sometimes more restrictive in their interpretation of statutory claims. Id.
17 Alan M. Koral & Walter Lucas, Defending The Individual Management Party
Under State Law, in LMGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1997, at 235, 283

(PLI Lit. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5256 1997).
18 id.
19 Id. at

284.

20 Id.
21 Id.
22

Alan M. Koral & Walter Lucas, Defending The Individual Management Party
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acts, more employers are purchasing Employment Practices Liability policies, which cover employers and employees against liability for negligent
and intentional acts as well as other liabilities.2
III. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
Neither Title VII nor its 1991 amendments explicitly address individual liability. 24 The debate revolves around the issue whether an individual
fits the statutory definition of "employer" within Title VII, due to the statute's "and any agent" phraseology. 25 The federal courts adopt different
approaches to answer the statutory question. 26 Some courts state that individual liability may attach, given the plain meaning of the statute.2 7
Other federal courts interpret the "and any agent" provision to simply attach common law respondeat superior liability to the employer for the
wrongful acts of its employees. 28 This issue, couched in the disparity
noted above, as well as other statutory and policy arguments, once presented a clear circuit split. 29 More recently, many circuit courts previously

Under State Law, in LMGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1997, at 235, 285
(PLI Lit. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5256 1997).
23 Id. See generally, Robert Cavallaro, Note, Corporate Buyer Beware: Deficiencies
in Directors' and Officers' Insurance Policies for Employment Practices Liability, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 231 (1997).
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e I - 17(1994).
25 See Cavallaro, supra Note 23, at 231. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(l)a (1994)
(setting out Title VII's statutory meaning of "employer"). The statute provides in pertinent
part: "The term employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting trade or
commerce who has fifteen or more employees.., and agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(l)a (1994).
26 Cheryl L. Feutz, Note, Statutory Construction and Judicial Policy-Making Impact
Whether Title Vii's Definition Of "Employer" Imposes IndividualLiability on an Agent, 62
Mo. L. REV. 153, 155 (1997). Feutz notes that these approaches include analyzing the
statute's plain language, the legislative purpose, and the resulting policy consequences in
allowing or rejecting individual liability. Id.
27 See Ruffino v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047-48 (D. Mass.
1995) (deciding that foreclosing the possibility of agent liability reduces the "employer"
definition to mere verbal surplusage). Courts which find individual liability from the plain
meaning of the statute reason that the "and any agent" provision subjects both the employer
and the individuals participating in the discrimination, to liability. Cavallaro, supra note
23, at 231.
28 Cavallaro, supra note 23, at 231.
29 See Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination By Managers and Supervisors:
Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title Vii, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 571 (1994) (noting
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in favor of individual liability or inconsistent in its rulings regarding individual 30liability, overwhelmingly rejected Title VII individual liability
claims.

the then-current circuit split).
30 See Gregory M.P. Davis, Comment, More Than a Supervisor Bargains For:
Individual Liability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Other Employment
Discrimination Statutes, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 321, 321 (1997). Currently, ten of the eleven
circuits which have addressed the issue have rejected imposing individual liability under
Title VII. Chatman v. Gentle Dental Ctr. of Waltham, 973 F. Supp. 228, 236 (1997). The
Second Circuit ruled that supervisors are not individually liable under the Title VII
definition of "employer." Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995). The
Third Circuit held that an agent cannot be sued for damages in his individual capacity based
on the great weight of authority from other jurisdictions. Sheridan v. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3rd Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit also established the rule
of no individual liability under Title VII. Grant v. Lone Star Co, 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 574. The Sixth Circuit found that an employee
may not be held individually liable for sex harassment claims under Title VII. Wathen v.
General Electric Co. 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit, in analyzing a
Title VII claim, held that "a supervisor does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title
VII's definition of employer." Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995).
Although the precise issue was not before the court, after reviewing numerous federal
decisions, The Eighth Circuit indicated that "whatever the law of the jurisdictions may have
been at one time, the more recent cases reflect a clear consensus on the issue before us:
supervisors and other employees cannot be held liable under Title VII in their individual
capacities." Lenhardt v. Basis Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (Sth Cir. 1995). The Ninth
Circuit was one of the first circuits to hold that there is no individual liability under the
federal anti-discrimination statutes. Cavallaro, supra note 23, at 233-34. The Ninth Circuit
stated that individuals cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII. Miller v.
Maxwell's International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit held
that personal capacity suits against individual supervisors are inappropriate under Title VII.
Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.2d 898, 900-01 (10th Cir. 1996). The Tenth Circuit also held that
in a sexual harassment case, an individual in a supervisory position, with sufficient control
over the employee, acts as the alter ego of the employer and it is the employer who is liable
for the employment practices of the individual. Sauers v. Salt Lake Cty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1125
(10th Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit found that the relief granted under Title VII is
against the employer, not the individual employee whose actions would constitute a
violation of the act. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11 th Cir. 1991). The
District of Columbia Circuit held that an agent cannot be sued for damages in his individual
capacity. Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Potential individual liability
under Title VII remains in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit held in 1989, that "an
individual qualifies as an 'employer' . . . if ... she serves in a supervisory position and
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The First Circuit has not clearly addressed the issue and remains the
only federal circuit without a ruling.3' As noted above, federal district
courts within the circuit are divided on the issue. 32 The most recent district court cases, however, follow the majority of circuits in holding that
individuals are not liable for discriminatory acts under Title VII. 33 Still,
ambiguity persists, leaving practitioners without guidance during the initial
strategic stages of litigation. 34 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, therefore, should resolve the conflict and follow the analysis employed in other
circuits as well as that emerging within the federal district courts in the
first circuit.
A. Arguments for Rejecting Title VII IndividualLiability
1. Congress Intended "Agent" Provision to IncorporateRespondeat
SuperiorLiability
The starting point in statutory interpretation is the language of the
statute.35 The plain meaning of a statute is controlling, "except in the rare

exercises significant control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing, or conditions of employment".
Paroline v. Unysis Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989). More recently though, the
court held that an individual could not be sued as an "employer" under the similarly worded
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), but did not rule out the possibility of
individual liability in other contexts. See Birbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507,
513 (4th Cir. 1994).
31See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 1997)
(declining to answer the question of Title VII individual liability).
32 See, e.g., Contreras-Bordallo v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya De Puerto Rico, 952 F.
Supp. 72, 73 (D.P.R. 1997) (holding that supervisory employees may not be held liable
under Title VII); Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562, 571-72 (D.R.I. 1996) (finding
that supervisory employees may be individually liable under Title VII); Ruffino v. State St.
Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1047-48 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that individuals
may be subject to personal liability under Title VII).
33 See Herrera v. Boyd Coating Co., 983 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding
that individuals are not subject to liability in their personal capacity); Danio v. Emerson
College, 963 F. Supp. 61, (D. Mass. 1997) (reasoning that imposing liability upon
employees in their individual capacities would contradict congressional intent); Chatman v.
Gentle Dental Ctr. of Waltham, 973 F. Supp. 228, 239 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding that an
employee who does not otherwise qualify as an employer, cannot be held liable under Title
VII). But see Martin v. Tennford Weaving Co. Inc., Civil No. 96-328-P-C, 1997 WL
50469, * I (D. Maine Jan. 28, 1997) (finding individual liability under Title VII).
34 See infra Part I.

35 Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2n" Cir. 1995) (citing Landreth Timber

Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)).
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cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
clearly at odds with the intentions of the drafters." 36 While some circuit
courts interpreted Title VH's language to allow individual liability, most
courts rule that the "and any agent" provision is a simple expression of
respondeat superior liability. 37 These courts reason that Title VH is a rare
case in which broader consideration of the statute is required. 38 While
Title VII's plain meaning implies that an employer's agent is a statutory
employee, further interpretation indicates that the statutory language
does
39
intent.
statutory
expressed
clearly
Congress'
with
not comport
2. IndividualLiability Runs Contraryto Title Vll's Statutory Scheme
The agent clause is part of a sentence in Title VII limiting liability to
employers with fifteen or more employees. 4° This limitation represents
Congress' intent to "strike a balance between the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace and protecting smaller employers." 4' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Miller v.
Maxwell's
Int'l,with
Inc.42thethatcosts
Congress
limitedwith
Titlelitigating
VII so as discrimination
not to burden
small entities
associated

36 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
37 See, e.g., Wathen v. General Electric Co. 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting

the obvious purpose of the "agent" provision was to impose respondeat superior liability);
Grant v. Lone Star, 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the "agent" provision as
incorporating respondeat superior liability into Title VII); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc.,
991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting individual liability under Title VII). But see
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that employees may
be personally liable if exercising significant control).
38 Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314(2d Cir.
1995).
39Id. The Tomka court found that individual liability was contrary to congressional
intent as expressed by Title VII's statutory scheme and remedial provisions. Id.
Specifically, the Second Circuit stated that Congress intended to limit Title VII liability to
employer-entities with fifteen or more employees and that agent liability would create a
result not contemplated by Congress. Id. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (explaining Title
VII's congressional intent). See also infra note 45 and accompanying text (examining
congressional intent regarding individual liability under Title VII).
40Id. Title VII provides that: "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.. ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b)
(1994).
41David J. Hanus, Note, Individual Supervisor Liability Under Title VII and the
ADEA, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 999, 1014 (1997) (citing E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations

Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995)).
42 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993).
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claims. 43 In Tomka v. Seiler Corp.,44 the court stated that it is
"'inconceivable' that Congress, concerned with protecting such small entities, would simultaneously allow civil liability to run against individual
employees." 45 According to the same analysis, courts have stated that
"incongruous results would occur if business owners employing, for example, ten employees are statutorily immune from suit, while a person who
supervises the same number of' people, in a company employing twenty or
more persons, would be liable. ""
3. IndividualLiability Contradictsto Title Vll's Remedial Provisions
Prior to the Civil Rights Acts of 1991, Title VII recovery was limited
to injunctive relief such as reinstatement and damages in the form of backpay.47 These remedies are equitable and are most appropriately provided
by employers, defined in the traditional sense of the word.4 Thus, the recovery provisions in place at Title VII's inception imply that Congress did
not contemplate individual liability when drafting Title VII. 49
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 adds compensatory and punitive damages to the remedies available to a victim of intentional discrimination. 50
Unlike reinstatement and backpay, money damages are the type normally
41

Id. at 587.

44

66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. (1995).

45 Id. at 1314 (citing Miller, 991 F.2d at 587). The Tomka court also points out that

the congressional floor debates on Title VII expressed that the cost of defending
discrimination claims was a factor in deciding to include a minimum employee threshold,
while there was a noticeable absence of mention of agent liability, implying that Congress
did not contemplate individual agent liability under the statute. Id. (citing 110 CONG. REC.
10, 13092 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Cotton); 110 CONG. REc. 10, 13088 1964 (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REc. 10, 13092-93 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Morse)).
46 Hanus, supra note 41, (citing Birbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510
(4th Cir. 1994)).
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (1994)
4
' Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 (citing Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Tomka goes on to note that one may argue, as the Tomka dissent did, that a supervisory
employee with the power to hire and fire should be treated as an employer due to this power
to reinstate and correct employment records. Id. at 1315. However, it is unlikely that
Congress intended to subject agents to liability for reinstatement and backpay because Title
VII speaks only of "agents," therefore, providing no basis for a distinction between agents
with, versus agents without, the power to hire and fire. Id.
49 Davis, supra note 30, at 336 (citing E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995)).
'0 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 la (b)3 (expanding the allowable damages under Title VII).
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borne by individuals. 51 Congress, however, calibrated the maximum allowable damage award according to the size of the employer without lifting the Title VII exemption for employers with less than fifteen employees. 52 Given this limitation of damages, Congress apparently intended that
only employer-entities could be liable for compensatory and punitive damages.53 "If Congress envisioned individual liability ... it would have included individuals in [the] litany of limitations and discontinued the exemption for small employers. 5 4
B. Arguments Raised in Favor of IndividualLiability
While the arguments explained above represent the opinion held in
the majority of circuits, it is appropriate to note the arguments in favor of a
contrary result.
1. The Plain Meaning of Title VII ProhibitsInterpretingthe "Agent"
Provision as Providingfor Respondeat Superior
The dissenting opinion in Tomka found that "the express language of
the statute permits individual liability under Title VII and sound jurisprudence counsels giving that statutory language its full effect. 55 Judge
Parker stated that a reading of the "and any agent" provision as incorporating respondeat superior liability violates two independent cannons of

statutory construction.16 First, Judge Parker wrote that such a reading re51Davis, supra note 30, at 336.
52 Id. 42 U.S.C. 1981 § 1981 a(b)(3) limitations provide:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section..
• and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not
exceed, for each complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees ... $50,000; (B) in the case of a respondent who has
more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees ... $100,000; (C) in the
case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees... $200,000; (D) in the case of a respondent who has more
than 500 employees... $300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b) 3 (1994).
53 Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Miller v.
Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993)).
54 Id. (quoting Miller, 991 F.2d at 588).
" Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318 (Parker, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 1318. But see id. at 1316-17 (responding to Judge Parker's dissent). The
majority pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court implied that the "agent" clause does serve
an independent purpose regarding the "scope of an employer's vicarious liability for the acts
of its agents: namely, that an employer's liability should be based on common law agency
principles." Id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)). The
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duces the agent clause to mere surplusage because, in his view, the common law principle would apply to the act regardless of any express statutory inclusion.57 Second, the Tomka dissent pointed out that the language
of the statute must be the beginning point in a statutory construction case
and that Title VII "speaks with such clarity, that there is no need to look
beyond the statute. 5 8
2. The Originaland Amended Remedial Provisions of Title VII Imply
CongressionalIntent to Include Individual Liability
As mentioned above, the original design of damage awards under Title VII limited plaintiffs' relief to backpay and other equitable relief such
as reinstatement. 59 Proponents of individual liability argue that by changing the damages allowable under Title VII, through the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress intended to open the door to individual liability.'
3. IndividualLiability's Necessity to Deter Employee Discrimination
Some argue that since the primary goal of Title VII is to eliminate
discrimination, individual liability is necessary to dissuade supervisors and
other individuals from violating the act.6' In AIC Security, the Equal EmTomka majority also reasoned its statutory analysis within the cannons of statutory
construction. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing statutory intent).
17 Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319 (Parker, J., dissenting).
58 Id. (Parker, J., dissenting).
But see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text
(explaining the statute's plain meaning and congressional intent).
59See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining the difference in damage awards, both prior to and
subsequent to the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
60 See Davis, supra note 30, at 337 (discussing Title VII and its damages scheme's
effect on individual liability) . In E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security, the E.E.O.C. argued that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 negates the conclusion that Congress did not contemplate
individual liability when it passed the anti-discrimination laws because compensatory and
punitive damages are typical damages obtainable from individuals. E.E.O.C. v. Aid
Security, 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995). The court, however, held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 further shows Congressional intent to exclude individual liability under
Title VII. Id. The Miller court similarly suggested that if Congress intended individual
liability, it would have included some provision for such in the "employer" definition or in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1993).
6! See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AIC Security, 55 F.3d
1276, 1282 (7th Cir.1995) (discussing plaintiffs' urging for individual liability under the
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ployment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "E.E.O.C.") claimed that
"through the loophole of no individual liability will pour a flood of unpunished and undeterrable discrimination. ' 62 Further, an opportunity to name
a victim's tormentor on the face of a public document, the complaint, gives
a victim a personal method of recrimination which may encourage more
claims than would otherwise be raised.63 It is unclear, however, whether
the imposition of individual liability under Title VII will necessarily deter
discrimination. 64 In addition, a "Title VII shield from personal liability is
not a license to sexually harass with impunity, because private employees
are still subject to state common law tort and contract claims. 65
4. IndividualLiability's Necessity to ProvideFull Compensationto
Victims of Sexual Harassment

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)). Although AIC Security dealt specifically with the
ADA and not Title VII, the court recognized that "Title VII, the ADA, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) use virtually the same definition of
'employer,' and that [clourts routinely apply arguments regarding individual liability to all
three statutes interchangeably." Id. See also Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (noting the similarities
between the statutes).
62AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282. The court, however, labeled these arguments "part
of the short parade of horribles" to make up for the fact that the E.E.O.C. lacked the support
of structured arguments. Id. The court eventually conceded that increasing the number of
defendants would increase deterrence, but such a liberal interpretation of the statute as to
allow for individual liability "cannot trump the narrow, focused conclusion we draw from
the ... statutes." Id.
63 See Davida H. Isaacs, "Its Nothing Personal"- But Should It Be?: Finding
Agent
Liabilityfor Violations of the FederalEmployment DiscriminationStatutes, 22 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. Change 505, 531 (1996) (citing AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282). However, it is
unclear whether the imposition of individual liability under Title VII will further Title VII's
goals.
64 Marianne C. Delpo, Essay, Individual Liability Under Title VII: What Did
Congress Mean by Employer?, 75 NEB. L. REV. 278, 287 (1996). Delpo notes that the
threat of losing one's job or severely damaging one's career is as effective as the threat of
personal liability for most employees. Id. An employer that has incurred civil liability due
to an employee's belief that he can violate Title VII with impunity will quickly correct that
employee's erroneous belief. Id. (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588
(9th Cir. 1993).
65 Id. (citing Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone
Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994) (mem.);
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 113 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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Proponents of individual liability also argue that it will help plaintiffs
realize full compensation in cases where an employer declares bankruptcy,
66
settles, or is only capable of partial satisfaction of adverse judgements.
However, "in the vast majority of cases an individual will not have the financial resources of the employer, nor will s/he have the foresight to create
67
a contingency fund to lessen the impact of discrimination suit damages."
More importantly, as opposed to employer liability, in which damage caps
are outlined via the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts will have
no guidance
68
from Congress to determine the limits of individual liability.
C. A Call For First Circuit Review and Decision
Given the overwhelming rejection of individual liability in the circuit
courts, the compelling arguments against individual liability above, and the
flaws noted with the arguments in favor of such liability, the First Circuit
should reject Title VII personal liability. The court should weigh the goal
of ending discrimination and the principle of personal accountability,
against Congress' intent and the hardship that would result from individual
liability. 69 The weighing of these options touches on the core of the
democratic process in that courts carefully tread on the separation of powers. 70 The First Circuit should align itself with the other circuits in leaving
individual liability under Title VII in the legislature's hands. 7' The court
must not mask its perception of the greater good under the veil of "plain
language" and must resist the temptation to ascribe its own values to Title
VII, while instead, entrusting Congress with the task of responding to pub72
lic concerns.

66 Isaacs,supra note 63, at 519.
67

See Davis, supra note 30, at 335-337.

68See id. As the Tomka court noted, in such a situation, the agent's liability would
have to depend on the number of persons the employer/entity employs which would
necessarily create anomalous results, not contemplated by Congress. Tomka, 66 F.3d at
1315-16. See also supra Part II.A.2-3.
69Id. at 343.
70

id.

71Gregory M.P. Davis, Comment, More Than A Supervisor Bargains For: Individual

Liability Under The Americans With Disabilities Act And
DiscriminationStatutes, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 321, 337 (1997).

Other Employment
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IV. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER MASSACHUSETTS' AIDING AND
ABETTING CLAUSE

While individual liability's existence on the federal level is unclear in
the first circuit, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B §4(5) expressly provides for individual liability. 73 The statute provides that "it is
unlawful for any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to
aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden
under this chapter or to attempt to do so. ' 74 Unfortunately, neither the
legislature, nor the Supreme Judicial Court has set out what type of action
or inaction by an employee may rise to the level of "aiding and abetting"
sexual harassment or discrimination.75 Again practitioners are left without
a clear indication from the legislature or the courts, which leads to unpredictability regarding individual liability in the sexual harassment context.
In two recent rulings, The United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts interpreted Chapter 151B § 4(5) and attempted to lend
guidance concerning the statute.76 The following section will analyze
these rulings and their impact on the law regarding individual liability for
sexual harassment in Massachusetts.
A. Chapin v. University of Massachusetts
The court in Chapin v. Univ. of Mass. expanded state level sexual
77
harassment liability to include non-action by individual supervisors.
Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Chapin court found that a supervisor
may be individually liable for mere non-action, or failure to investigate
complaints of sexual harassment. 78 Interpreting Massachusetts law, the

73See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(5) (1996) (allowing individual liability for
"aiding and abetting" sexual harassment). Id.
74 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(5). In Ruffino v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., the
court noted that this chapter applies "not only to employers acting through their principals
and agents, but also to any person who aids or abets discrimination or retaliatory conduct
prohibited under [the statute]." 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1048 (D. Mass. 1995).
75See Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating
that no reported case of the SJC addresses whether an individual may be liable for failure to

investigate a sexual harassment complaint).
76 See id. (deciding that mere inaction or failure to investigate, may rise
to the level of
aiding and abetting under the statute); Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co., 989 F. Supp. 54, 62
(D. Mass. 1997) (finding that two factors must be present for inaction to give rise to
liability).
77Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 80 (D. Mass. 1997).
78 id.
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Chapin court concluded the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would
follow the same course if faced with the issue.79 The court reasoned that
such non-feasance, when a supervisor knew or should have known that
sexual harassment existed in the workplace, may constitute actionable
"aiding and abetting" in violation of Chapter 151 B § 4(5).80
Madonna Rand Chapin, a former University of Massachusetts at
Lowell (hereinafter "UML") police officer brought suit against UML and
others including James Rowe, the UML police chief.8 1 Chapin alleged
discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act against UML
and aiding and abetting discrimination under Chapter 151B against Rowe
individually. 82 On Rowe's motion to dismiss, the court viewed all allegations in Chapin's complaint as true and drew all reasonable inferences
therefrom in Chapin's favor.83

Chapin alleged that prior to her employment at UML, female officers
at the university experienced sexual discrimination in the form of harassment and that Rowe knew or should have known of this conduct, but failed
to act to remedy or prevent its occurrence. 84 Chapin was employed by
UML from February 1993 until May 1993, during which time she alleges
UML officers Theokas and Parent, among others, sexually harassed her.85
Chapin claimed this harassment included: threats to her physical and
mental well being; statements disparaging Chapin as well as women in
general, made in Chapin's presence; sexual gestures; solicitation of com79 Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 80.
go Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that it is an unlawful practice for an
employer to discriminate against any individual because of one's sex in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(l) (1996).
Further, the statute notes that sexual harassment constitutes discrimination under the act.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(16) (1996). The applicable "aiding and abetting" clause
provides that "it is unlawful for any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to
aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter
or to attempt to do so." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151 B § 4(5)(1996).
8I Chapin v. University. of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D. Mass. 1997).
82 Id. Chapin's full complaint also alleged aiding and abetting discrimination, as well
as sexual harassment, civil rights violations, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress against George Theokas (police sergeant) and Paul Parent (acting shift
supervisor). Id. These claims are outside the scope of this article in that they do not address
a supervisor's individual liability for inaction in the face of sexual harassment complaints.
83 Id. (citing Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 105 F.3d 734, 735 (1st Cir. 1997)).
84 Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 75.
15 Id. at 75-76
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plaints regarding Chapin's performance; and false accusations about her
performance. s6 Chapin allegedly complained about the harassment, but
Rowe and UML failed to investigate her claims until one year after her
period of employment. s7 Chapin claimed she was constructively discharged from her position and suffered severe emotional distress rendering
her unable to work. 8
Regarding the allegations against Rowe, the Chapin court found that
individuals, including supervisory or co-employees, may be held liable for
violations of the aiding and abetting statute. 9 More importantly, the court
addressed the issue whether the failure of a supervisory employee to investigate, correct, or prevent sexual harassment, after it is reported,
amounts to aiding and abetting. 9° The court ultimately found that such
forbearance by a supervisory employee may constitute a violation of Massachusetts law. 9' The Chapin court buttressed its conclusion on several
grounds. The court premised its holding on Chapter 151 B's mandate that,
as a whole, the statute is to be construed liberally so that its purposes may
be achieved. 92 Judge Lindsay noted that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court accords deference to the interpretations of the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination (hereinafter "M.C.A.D.") regarding
Chapter 151B § 4(5).93 The holding then relied on such M.C.A.D. analyses of the aiding and abetting language in Chapter 151B § 4(5).94 Finally,
the court drew from parallel decisions in which courts interpreted supervi-

16 Id. at 76.
87Chapin v. Univ. of Mass., 977 F.Supp. 72, 76 (D. Mass. 1997).
88id.
89Id. at 78 (citing Ruffino v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 908 F. Supp. 1019, 1048 (D.

Mass. 1995)).
90 Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 78. The court noted that although no reported case of the
Supreme Judicial Court dealt with the issue in question, the court was not without guidance.
Id. at 78.
91Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 80.
92Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 15 1B § 9 (1996). (outlining the statute's mandate of
liberal interpretation).
93 Chapin v. Univ. of Mass., 977 F.Supp. 72, 78 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing CollegeTown v. M.C.A.D., 400 Mass. 156, 165, 508 N.E.2d 587, 593 (Mass. 1987)).
94 Chapin, 977 F.Supp. at 78 (citing Jorge v. Silver City Dodge, 15 M.D.L.R. 1518,
1531 (1993); Przybycien v. Aid Maintenance Co. , 13 M.D.L.R. 1266, 1283 (1991); Hope
v. San Ran, Inc., 8 M.D.L.R. 1195, 1211 (1986).
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sors' failure to act under federal laws as well as other states' similar aiding
and abetting clauses.95
1. Analysis
a. Individual Liabilityfor Supervisors Under Chapter 151B
As noted above, while employees are not generally individually liable
for sexual harassment or discrimination under Chapter 151 B, individuals
may be liable under the aiding and abetting clause of that act. 9 6 The
Chapin court correctly points out that the district court in Ruffino v. State
Street Bank and Trust Co. 97 also noted this distinction.9 8 The state law's

general provision (Chapter 151 B § 4(1)) applies to "an employer, by himself or his agent," therefore, precluding individual liability, while Chapter
151B § 4(5) (aiding and abetting provision) specifically applies to "any
person whether an employer or employee or not." 99 Without guidance
from Massachusetts courts or the First Circuit, the Chapin court soundly
based this portion of its ruling on the plain wording of the statute as well as
the Ruffino court's interpretation.' 0 0
b. Supervisor'sFailureto Act CreatesAiding and Abetting Liability
i. Reliance on MCAD Interpretationsto Support Liabilityfor Inaction

As a basis for relying on M.C.A.D. decisions regarding this issue, the
Chapin court notes that the Supreme Judicial Court "accords deference to

95 Chapin, 977 F.Supp. at 80.
96 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 4(5) (1996) (stating that this section applies to
"any person whether an employer or an employee or not").
97 908 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1995).
98 Id. at 1048.

99 See id. (explaining the difference in terminology in the two provisions of Chapter
15IB as a basis for finding individual supervisor liability). The Ruffino court also ruled an
individual may be liable for federal Title VII discrimination violations. Id. at 1047. Title
VII's text provides that "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (1)
To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's...
sex . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1994). That statute defines "employer" as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any
agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). While the first circuit remains silent on this
issue, Ruffino sided with the minority of courts within the circuit split on this issue.
Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1019. (citing Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th
Cir. 1992)). See also Paroline v. Unysis Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989); Owens
v. Rush 636 F.2d 283, 286 (10th Cir. 1980).
100 Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D. Mass. 1997).
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interpretations of Chapter 151B rendered by the M.C.A.D."'O' While partially true, the Supreme Judicial Court's deference is more specific in that
it accords deference to statutory interpretationsprovided by the
adminis02
trative body when interpreting broadly set out legislative policy.,
Chapin first points to the Jorge v. Silver City Dodge, Inc.'0 3 decision
as a basis for its finding. °4 In Silver City, managers at an auto dealership
subjected a female employee, Jorge, to lewd comments and unconsented
touching over a seven month period. 0 5 Jorge complained to her supervisor until granted a meeting with the District Manager/Vice-President, who
promised an investigation.' 6 The District Manager met with the alleged
harassers who denied that any incident occurred. 0 7 Within one day, Jorge
stopped work due to the harassment and began medical treatment for
anxiety.'0
The same week, the District Manager proposed that Jorge
transfer to another of the corporation's dealerships, which Jorge reluctantly
agreed to do.' 9 Jorge was humiliated and did not complete a full day's
work at the new dealership because the entire staff knew the reason for her
transfer." 0

The Silver City hearing officer found that "an employer is liable for
failing to eradicate hostile or offensive work environments, and has an affirmative duty to investigate complaints of sexual harassment.... .,,.. The
hearing officer also explained that "failure to investigate gives tacit support
to the discrimination because the absence of sanctions encourages abusive
behavior." 12 Silver City found the dealership's investigation inadequate
in that it only involved questioning the alleged perpetrators.' 13 Ultimately,

1o1Id.
102 See College-Town, Div. of Interco Inc. v. M.C.A.D.,

400 Mass. 156, 166, 508

N.E.2d 587, 593 (explaining the SJC's willingness to defer to M.C.A.D. decisions regarding
statutory interpretation).
103 15 M.D.L.R. at 1518 (1993).
104 Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 78.

105 Silver City, 15 M.D.L.R. at 1518.
'06 Id.
107 Id.

at 1523.

"08Id. at 1524.
109 Id.

10 Jorge v. Silver City Dodge, Inc. et al., 15 M.D.L.R. at 1518 (1991).
.. Id. at 1531 (citing Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E. D.
Mich. 1977)); Lynch v. Western Union, 13 M.D.L.R. 1621, 1647 (1991).
"2 Silver City, 15 M.D.L.R. at 1531 (quoting Munford, 441 F. Supp. at 466).
Silver City, 15 M.D.L.R. at 1531.
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Silver City concluded that the employer was liable under Chapter 151 B §
4(16) for the harassing conduct of its employee managers and for failing to
eradicate the hostile work environment which it created.14
Silver City confined its reasoning to an employer's liability under
Chapter 151B § 4(16A). The decision does not find or discuss individual
liability under chapter 151B § 4(5) which was at issue in Chapin.'15 Silver
City discusses failure to investigate as lending tacit support for harassment
as mentioned above, but it does not attempt to fit such inaction within the
ambit of aiding and abetting under Chapter 151 B. 16 Further, the Chapin
court's deference to the M.C.A.D. opinion is unfounded in that the Silver
City decision
is not a statutory interpretation as outlined in College17
Town."

The Chapin court next cites Przybycien v. Aid Maintenance Co.,'"8 as9
lending support for its interpretation of the aiding and abetting statute."
Again, Chapin's deference to an administrative ruling is misguided. Przybycien involved repeated sexual harassment perpetrated on a female mainPrzybycien reported the
tenance worker by her immediate supervisor.'
harassment to Caputo, the perpetrator's supervisor, who scheduled a
meeting with all parties including Przybycien's witness.1 2' Caputo arrived
late at the meeting and only interviewed the alleged harasser as a result,
who simply denied the allegations. 22 When the harassment continued,
Caputo transferred Przybycien to another store where the harassment did
not cease and caused Przybycien to resign.123

114

Id. at 1529.

Chapter 151B § 4(16A) specifically prohibits an employer from

sexually harassing its employees.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.

151B § 4(16A).

115 See Jorge v. Silver City Dodge Inc. et al., 15 M.D.L.R. 1518, 1529 (1993).
(discussing implications and potential liability for failure to investigate, without mentioning
any aspect of chapter 151B § 4(5)'s aiding and abetting liability imposition).
116 See id. (stating that such actions coupled with the absence of sanctions encourages
abusive behavior).
17 See College-Town, 400 Mass. at 166, 508 N.E.2d at 593 (noting that an
administrative interpretation of statute will be accorded deference by the SJC, but making
no mention of deference to M.C.A.D. rulings generally).
118 13 M.D.L.R. at 1266 (1991).
19Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D. Mass. 1997).
120 Przybycien v. Aid Maintenance, 13 M.D.L.R. 1266, 1269-70 (1991).
121Id. at 1272.
122

123

Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275-76.
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The Przybycien court found employer liability based on the creation
of a sexually harassing or hostile work environment. 124 The Przybycien
hearing officer analyzed Aid Maintenance's failure to investigate the claim
or discipline the alleged perpetrator in the context of whether Aid Maintenance took adequate steps to remedy the situation once on notice.' 25 The
officer explained, as did the Silver City hearing officer, that a failure to
investigate harassment claims or to sanction a potential harasser, may lead
to tacit support and encouragement of abusive behavior. 26 The holding
did not address such inaction's implications on an individual's potential
liability for aiding and abetting harassment under chapter 151 B §4(5). The
Przybycien decision does not constitute an interpretation of the aiding and
abetting statute at issue in 27Chapin and should not have been deferred to as
such by the Chapin court.
Lastly, the Chapin court turns to M.C.A.D's decision in Hope v. San
Ran 28 for guidance regarding the aiding and abetting statute. 29 Hope involved sexual harassment against a female bar tender at a hotel lounge over
a fourteen month period by the bar's night supervisor, McGhee.1 30 Hope
complained about the harassment to San Ran's general manager and coowner, Gulko. 3 ' Gulko indicated that he would set up a meeting between
himself, Hope, and McGhee, but never did. 3 2 The harassment subsequently continued and Hope confronted Gulko again. 133 Gulko then con124
125
126

Id. (citing College-Town, 400 Mass. 156, 508 N.E.2d 587).
Przybycien Aid Maintenance, 13 M.D.L.R. 1266, 1283 (1991).
Id. (citing Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich.

1977)). The court also explained that an employer is duty-bound to investigate sexual
harassment complaints because it is liable for failing to remedy a known hostile or offensive
work environment. Id. (citing Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. at 459;
Garziano v. E.I. Dupont deNemours & Co., 818 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1987)).
127 See Chapin v. University of Massachusetts 977 F. Supp. 72, 78
(D. Mass. 1997)
(noting the Supreme Judicial Court's deference to M.C.A.D interpretation of
Chapter 151B) (citing College-Town, 400 Mass. 156, 166, 508 N.E.2d 587, 593 (Mass.
1987)). See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (explaining the deference outlined
in College Town).
12' 8 M.D.L.R. at 1195 (1991).
129 Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 78. (citing Hope, 8 M.D.L.R. at 1283). Chapin looks to
Hope for the proposition that the M.C.A.D. has held a supervisor liable for aiding and
abetting in the retaliatory firing of an employee who complained of sexual harassment. Id.
130 Hope, 8 M.D.L.R. at 1197-02.

"' Id.at 1200.
132 id.
33 Id. at

1201.
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fronted McGhee regarding Hope's complaints.' 34 After their conversation,
McGhee began to monitor Hope's performance and noted every incident
which might be used as a pretext for Hope's termination. 35 Within one
year, McGhee fired Hope for reasons such as her failure to accept pennies
from customers. 136 The following day, Hope went to San Ran and told
Gulko she did not understand her firing, complained again about the harassment, and indicated she planned to file a complaint with M.C.A.D..
Gulko asked Hope to work for another week to straighten the37 situation out
and Hope agreed; but Gulko never contacted her as planned.
The M.C.A.D. hearing officer in Hope found San Ran liable under
Chapter 151B because McGhee's actions amounted to the creation of a
discriminatory, sexually charged atmosphere which affected the conditions
of Hope's employment.138 Additionally, the Hope hearing officer found
McGhee and Gulko individually liable as supervisors for aiding and abetting San Ran in its discrimination, thereby violating Chapter 151B §4
(5).139 The Hope decision based its determination of aiding and abetting
liability on McGhee's and Gulko's acquiescence in Hope's termination
when she complained of sexual harassment.' 4°
Unlike the other M.C.A.D cases cited in Chapin, the Hope decision
expressly interpreted the aiding and abetting statute at issue in Chapin.'4'
The Chapin court, therefore, properly looked to this administrative ruling
for guidance in determining the issue.' 42 The Hope decision, though, is
significantly distinguishable. The Chapin court erroneously bases Rowe's
individual liability on the finding of individual aiding and abetting liability
in Hope. The Hope case addressed individuals' outright acts in that each
sought, and then acquiesced in, the complainant employee's improper

134 Hope v. San-Ran, Inc., 8 M.D.L.R. 1195, 1201 (1986).
'35 Id.

136

Id. at 1201-02.

137 id.

"3'Id. at 1209.
139 Hope v. San-Ran, Inc., 8 M.D.L.R. 1195, 1211 (1986).
140 id.
141See Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D. Mass. 1997) (explaining

the issue for the court's determination). The Chapin court noted that the issue is whether a
supervisory employee's failure to investigate, correct, or prevent sexual harassment, after it
has been reported, amounts to aiding and abetting the harassment). Id.
142See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (explaining the deference outlined
in College Town).
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termination. 43 In this sense, each supervisor in Hope took action toward
aiding and abetting the sexual harassment. In Chapin, the plaintiff alleged
mere inaction by a supervisory employee. 44 In Hope, the same inaction of
the character alleged in Chapin was present in that Gulko twice failed even
to investigate the victim's claim.' 45 Despite this inaction through a failure
to investigate, the Hope court analyzed aiding and abetting liability in
terms of the individuals' action.14 Hope did not go so far as to say that
the individual defendant's inaction violated the aiding and abetting statute. 4 The Chapin court improperly draws aiding and abetting liability for
inaction from a case which was faced with the same type of inaction, yet
declined to mention it as a form of aiding and abetting with the meaning of
Chapter 151B § 4(5).
ii. Analysis of Other Courts' FindingsRegarding "Inaction" as Aiding and Abetting
The Chapin court also looks to other federal courts' statutory interpretations of aiding and abetting discrimination.' 4 The Chapin court notes
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 's interpretation of
Pennsylvania's aiding and abetting discrimination statute."49 In Dici v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.,150 The Third Circuit held that a supervisor's failure to take action to prevent known harassment gave rise to an
aiding and abetting claim.' 5' Additionally, the Chapin court cited to Bonner v. Guccione, 152 which interpreted New York's aiding and abetting
statute and concluded that Guccione
could be held liable even absent a
53
finding of active participation.

143Hope, 8 M.D.L.R. at

1211.

144 Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 79.
145 Hope v. San-Ran, Inc., 8 M.D.L.R. 1195, 1200-02 (1986).
'46 Id. at 1211.
147 Id.

148 Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 78 (D. Mass. 1997).
149 id.

150 91 F.3d at 542 (3rd Cir. 1996).

1 ' See Id. at 553 (discussing Pennsylvania's aiding and abetting liability provision in
PA 43 CONST.STAT. ANN. § 955(e)). The Dici court found that the alleged facts, that the
supervisor knew or should have known of the harassment perpetrated against Dici and
repeatedly refused to take prompt action to end such harassment, if proven, would constitute
aiding and abetting under the state statute. Id.
152No. 94 CIV. 7735, 1997 WL 362311 * 14(S.D.NY. July 1, 1997).
151 Id. at *14. The Guccione court did not expressly state that inaction amounts to
liability under the statute. Id. Rather, the Guccione court merely gave deference to another
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Despite the Chapin court's reliance on the opinions noted above, the
court points out that other courts came to the opposite conclusion when
faced with a supervisor's inaction in the context of an aiding and abetting
discrimination situation.' 54
iii. Analysis of "Inaction" in Other Contexts by Federal Courts
Lastly, the Chapin court looked to federal courts regarding liability
for inaction. 155 The court noted that on the federal level, the "failure of a
supervisor to respond to complaints of harassment can actively contribute
to the creation of a hostile work environment.' 56 The Chapin court next
pointed out that the second circuit in yet another context, found that failure
of a supervisor to respond to complaints of harassment can be sufficient
for
157
liability, once the supervisor is put on notice of the harassment.

district court's dicta, which noted that a plaintiff could allege an aiding and abetting claim
without alleging active participation. See id. (explaining individual liability as discussed in
Abdullajeva v. Club Quarters, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 0383 (LMM) 1996 WL 497029 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 15, 1996)). The Guccione court found that an individual may be liable for inaction
based on two alternative theories. Id. The court notes the aiding and abetting statute as one
theory due to the dicta in Abdullajeva, as well as, liability under the general provisions of
the New York anti-discrimination statute due to a party's ownership interest. Id. The
Guccione court concentrated its analysis on this second theory which is based on the
statute's definition of "employer" including individuals with an ownership interest in the
employing entity. Id. at 13. Chapter 151B limits liability under its general provisions to
employers and does not allow for individual liability in this context, absent a showing of
aiding and abetting discrimination under Chapter 15 1B § 4(5). MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 151B
§ 4(5)(1996).
154See Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 79 (D.Mass. 1997) (explaining
that federal courts in other jurisdictions have reached opposite results interpreting state
"aiding and abetting" liability). Specifically, the Chapin court points to Tyson v. CIGNA
Corp. 918 F.Supp. 836, 841 (D. N.J. 1996) (refusing to find aiding and abetting for a failure
to act where the defendant knew of the existence of sexual harassment).
155
Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 79 (referring to other courts' interpretation of inaction in
contexts other than an "aiding and abetting" statute).
156 Id. (citing Saad v. Stanley St. Treatment & Resources, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-11434DPW, 1994 WL 846911 *10 (D.Mass. May 20, 1994). The Saad court stated that "no
doubt an inadequate response to a sexual harassment complaint could itself foster a hostile
environment and so give rise to liability therefor[sic]." Saad, 1994 WL 846911 at *10.
Saad dealt with an employer's hostile work environment liability and not individual liability
under an aiding abetting statute or even Title VII. See id. at * 1.
157See Chapin, 977 F. Supp. at 78 (citing Jemmott v. Coughlin, 85 F.3d 61, 67-68 (2d
Cir. 1996)). The Jemmott court found liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jemmott, 85 F.3d
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The Chapin court next looked to Lipsett v. University. of Puerto
Rico, 8 which noted that failure to act regarding sexual harassment can
occur through mere inattention or through deliberate indifference, a conscious act of the will.' 59 The Chapin court asserted that the latter form of
non-feasance is a designed willful act of forbearance in a situation requiring action.' 6° From this assertion, the Chapin court looked to the fact that
Rowe had notice of the harassment and failed to act. 16 The court then
drew an ostensibly reasonable inference that Rowe was deliberately indifferent toward the harassment and affirmatively condoned it.162 The court
stated that "inaction on the part of a high official may be an affirmative
link to conduct which violates [Chapter 151B § 4(5)]. ' 163
Chapin's reasoning is unsound in that it relies on these three opinions
which do not attempt to define state level "aiding and abetting" liability
which was at issue in the case. The court merely discusses instances in
which inaction may lead to liability under other laws.' 64 For example, the
court relies on its "affirmative link" rationale, which comes from Lipsett.165 Lipsett dealt with inaction leading to individual liability for a
constitutional violation, not whether inaction may lead to "aiding and
abetting" in any context.' 66 Again, the Chapin court failed to analyze
whether or to what extent inaction leads specifically to aiding and abetting
liability under Chapter 151B § 4(5).
2. ConclusionsRegarding the Chapin Decision
Absent any clear guidance from the state courts, Chapin found that
inaction regarding, or failure to investigate, sexual harassment claims
amounts to "aiding and abetting" sexual harassment. 67 The court's tenuat 67-68.
"' 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
9 Id.

at 902.

160
Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 79 (D. Mass. 1997).
161Id.

162See id. (citing Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902). The court also noted that a deaf ear from

management may contribute to and encourage the hostility of the workplace, creating an
impression that employees may discriminate with impunity. Id.
163

Id.

'64 See
165

Id.
See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902 (discussing inaction amounting to supervisory

encouragement of depriving citizens of their constitutionally protected rights).
166See id. (analyzing whether inaction provides a sufficient causal link to a
constitutional violation).
167 See Chapin v. University of Mass., 977 F. Supp. 72, 80 (D. Mass. 1997)
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ous reasoning did not clear up the ambiguity left by the legislature regarding Chapter 151 B § 4(5). Rather, the court opened the door to further
clouded reasoning, making greater, the need for a firm statutory interpretation from the Supreme Judicial Court.
B. Chapin'sAftermath
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently had an opportunity to again interpret Chapter 151 B §4(5) in Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co.' 68 Again ruling on a motion to dismiss an individual liability claim, the court limited the breadth of the Chapin decision. 69 Morehouse involved a group of employee defendants who allegedly posted obscenely defaced pictures of Morehouse, their co-worker, at a
company-sponsored golf tournament.1 70 The court ruled on the defendant,
Wendling's, motion for summary judgment.' 7 ' Wendling did not actively
participate in the wrongdoing, but failed to remove the pictures, openly
laughed about the pictures at the tournament, and later lied about all of the
defendants' involvement. 172 As the defendant in Chapin argued, Wendling
73
averred that his nonfeasance fell short of that required to find liability.
The Morehouse court distinguished the facts of the case before it,
from the circumstances in Chapin.174 The court inferred from the Chapin
analysis that the police chief "1) was required to act under the circumstances, and 2) was in a position (as chief) to discipline the harassers (who
were the chiefs subordinates) and stop the misconduct.' ' 75 The court
stated that although Wendling's conduct amounted to "deliberate indifference" toward the wrongdoing, as was the case in Chapin, Wendling was
not acting in a situation where action was required or arguably even expected of him. 76 Wendling's position as a supervisor of Morehouse's
77 Furhusband did not give rise to any duty to stop the disparagement.
(concluding that the Supreme Judicial Court would follow the Chapin court's reasoning
given the requirement that Chapter 151 B be construed liberally).
168Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co., 989 F.Supp. 54 (D. Mass. 1997).
169See id. at 62 (distinguishing the Chapin decision).
170 Id. at 58-60.
171Id. at 60-62.
172 Id. at 62.
173See Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co., 989 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting
the similarity between Wendling's argument and that raised in Chapin).
174Id. at 62.
175id.
176id.

177
Id.
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ther, Wendling was not in a position to stop the wrongdoing because 1the
78
two perpetrators were higher-ranking employees, not his subordinates.
The court noted that while stopping the other defendants' actions would
have been a "more laudable course of action," his failure to do so did not
amount to the type of nonfeasance found to "aid and abet" sexual harassment in Chapin.'79
The Morehouse decision lends some guidance as to how practitioners
should proceed in a Chapter 151 B § 4(5) suit in that it sets out a two prong
test inferred from Chapin.'80 This test is sound because it limits the scope
of individual liability for sexual harassment to situations where an employee has a supervisory duty to act.' 8' However, the test, still fails to establish how meeting this test for inaction specifically amounts 8 to
"aiding
2
and abetting" sexual harassment, within the terms of the statute.
C. A Better Result?
The Supreme Court of Tennessee recently decided in Carr v. United
ParcelService, 83 whether an individual's failure to act gives rise to individual liability for "aiding and abetting" sexual harassment under a statute
almost identical to Massachusetts Chapter 15 1B § 4(5).' 4 Like the federal
courts in Massachusetts, the Tennessee court was faced with a statute that
did not provide a definition of "aiding and abetting."' 85 Unlike these
courts, the Carrcourt chose to analyze the term "aiding and abetting" according to its common usage as creating accomplice liability. 8 6 In inter178

79

Morehouse v. Berkshire Gas Co., 989 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Mass. 1997).

id.

18oSee id. (noting the inference drawn from Chapin).
181See id. (recognizing the prerequisite that employee have a supervisory duty to act).
182 See id. (relying on Chapin). The court did not delve into what constitutes "aiding
and abetting" liability. Id. The court merely accepted as true, the reasoning of the Chapin
court by simply reading into that decision, a limitation to fit the less egregious facts before
the court. Id.
183 955 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1997).
184 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-301(2) (1991 Repl.) (providing for individual aiding
and abetting liability for sexual harassment). The statute states in pertinent part that: "[it] is
a discriminatory practice for a person or two (2) or more persons to: ...(2) [a]id, abet,
incite, compel or command a person to engage in any of the acts or practices declared
discriminatory under this chapter ....
" Id. A person is defined under the statute as "one
(1)or more individuals..." Id.
181 See Carr,955 S.W.2d. at 836 (noting the statutory ambiguity).
186 See id. (finding that the statute in question established accomplice liability but
failed to supply a definition of "aiding and abetting").
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preting the statute, the court looked to the common law civil liability theory of aiding and abetting and determined that liability requires
"affirmative conduct."' 8 7 The Carrcourt went on to state that "a failure to
act ... is insufficient for accomplice liability."'' 8 The Carrcourt applied
the traditional meaning to the words "aiding and abetting" contained in the
statute. The federal district courts in Massachusetts, perhaps, should have
applied similar logic to avoid the present, persistent ambiguity surrounding
inaction leading to individual liability under Chapter 151 B § 4(5)
V. CONCLUSION
Individual liability is an important issue in sexual harassment litigation for both plaintiff's and defendant's practitioners. For plaintiff's attorneys, for instance, such liability can be a practical asset to destroy federal
jurisdiction or secure relief in the case of an insolvent employer. For defendant's attorneys, the prospect of individual liability creates the need to
make important strategic decisions in litigation to avoid conflicting interests and to develop adequate defenses for both the individual and the employer. The current ambiguity regarding individual liability under Title
VII and Chapter 151 B's aiding and abetting clause causes unpredictability
in the law. This ambiguity, in turn, results in practical and strategic difficulty for lawyers bringing and defending sexual harassment claims.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit should, therefore, decide whether individual liability for sexual harassment exists under
Title VII. Specifically, the court should join the overwhelming majority of
circuits in negating such individual liability for the reasons set forth above.
On the state level, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts should
more clearly define potential individual liability under Chapter 151B by
setting out the parameters of "aiding and abetting" sexual harassment. In
doing so, the court should look to the plain meaning of the statutory language. Such an analysis should lead the court to the same conclusion as
that reached under the Tennessee "aiding and abetting" statute: that the
words aiding and abetting, in their traditional common law context, require
some affirmative action beyond misfeasance to find individual liability.
These decisions would alleviate the ambiguity in the law currently affecting practitioners. In addition, these decisions would allow supervisory
employees to better carryout their functions in the workplace without the
fear of damaging personal litigation. Employers would have a further incentive, if not an obligation, to vigorously enforce its written sexual har-

187 Carr v. United Parcel Service, 955 S.W.2d. 832, 836 (Tenn. 1997).
188

id.
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assment policies, thereby weeding sexual harassment from the workplace
along with its actual perpetrators.
PatrickJ. McGrath

